



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

City of Goshen v. England, 5 L. R. A. 253 (Ind.). The prevailing rule concerning injuries to persons is that where a person is injured by the negligence of another party, and the injured person employs surgeons and doctors of ordinary skill and care in their profession, and the injury fails to heal properly, the party injured may recover for the unfavorable result of the injury, *Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm*, 109 Ill. 20; *Radman v. Habersto*, 1 N. Y. Supp. 561.

DAMAGES—EXCESSIVE VERDICT—INJURIES.—*VESTER v. RHODE ISLAND CO.*, 67 ATL. (R. I.) 444.—*Held*, that a verdict of \$21,000 for personal injuries resulting in a miscarriage and an aggravation of a dislocated kidney, not causing total disability, is excessive.

An Appellate Court will not set aside a verdict on the ground of excessive damages unless it is so excessive as to suggest that the jury was actuated by bias, prejudice, passion, or some undue influence. *Jacobs v. Bangor*, 16 Me. 187; *Schmidt v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.*, 23 Wis. 186; *Howland v. Oakland St. Ry. Co.*, 110 Cal. 513. The trial judge should exercise his discretion to cut down excessive verdicts in personal injury cases. *Chicago v. Leseth*, 43 Ill. App. 480. In actions for personal torts the law does not fix any precise rule for the admeasurement of damages, but leaves their assessment to the good sense and unbiased judgment of the jury. *Aldrich v. Palmer*, 24 Cal. 513. The amount of damages awarded should be the amount awarded for injuries of a like nature and extent. *Lockwood v. 23d St. Ry. Co.*, 7 N. Y. Supp. 663. "We cannot disturb the verdict, because it may seem to us too large." *Brown v. Sullivan*, 71 Tex. 470. Courts are reluctant to interfere with verdicts of juries on account of excessive damages. *Kennon v. Gilmer*, 5 Mont. 273. For a case somewhat similar in its nature to this one where the court did reduce the damages, see *Hamilton v. Gt. Falls St. Ry. Co.*, 17 Mont. 334. For somewhat analogous cases where the courts refused to reduce the damages, see *Groves v. Rochester*, 39 Hun. (N. Y.) 5 Ga.; *Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dooley*, 86 Ga. 295.

DIVORCE—EVIDENCE—SUFFICIENCY.—*MURPHY v. MURPHY*, 113 N. W. 582.—*Held*, there is no hard and fast rule preventing the granting of a divorce on complainant's testimony alone, though it is undoubtedly the correct rule that where a divorce is so granted, the right thereto must be very clearly established.

DIVORCE—FAILURE TO PAY ALIMONY.—*OTILLIO v. OTILLIO*, 44 So. 799 (LA.).—*Held*, the failure of a defendant to pay promptly the alimony which he is ordered to pay by a judgment does not carry with it a contempt of court *pro se* and *ipso facto* as the result of such failure.

JUDGMENT—RES JUDICATA.—PARTIES, *SOUTHERN ELECTRIC SECURITIES CO. ET AL. v. STATE*, 44 SOUTH. 785 (MISS.).—*Held*, where a corporation was not a party to a bill to restrain another corporation from voting a large amount of the first corporation's stock because the holding company was a trust, the judgment in such action would not be binding on the original company in a subsequent action by the state to forfeit its charter.

EQUITY—JURISDICTION—CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS OF CORPORATIONS.—*TORREY ET AL. v. TOLEDO PORTLAND CEMENT CO. ET AL.*, 113 N. W. 580 (MICH.).